“That I not always in such a way made the things now, like the others it straight wanted -, I consider myself evenly, what the others probably believed and make it then in principle differently. If thus Herr Stalin expected that we attack in the center - I did not want to attack at all in the center. Not only not perhaps because Herr Stalin believed in it, but because because of it was not to me so much at all. I wanted to come to the Volga, in a certain department, at a certain city. Coincidentally it does not carry themselves for the names of Stalin however thinks you that I marched therefore thereless - it could be called also completely differently - to separate because a completely important point am there. There one cuts 30 Millionen tons traffic, among them nearly to Neun off Millionen tons oil traffic. There flowed together whole wheat from this enormous areas of the Ukraine, the Kuban area, in order to be northward transported. There manganese ore was carried; there was a gigantic place of transshipment. I wanted to take that, and - you know - we are, we have him! There is only a few completely small Plätzchen there. Now the others say: “Why don't they fight then faster?” Because I want to have there no second Verdun, but it with completely small combat patrols makes. The time plays thereby no role. It comes up no more ship the Volga, and that is the decision end! They made also the reproach for us, why we waited with Sewastopol so long. Now, because I did not want to set a gigantic mass murders also there. But Sewastopol is into our hand pleases and the Krim is into our hand pleases and we target toughly persistently around target achieved. And if now the opponent makes for his part institutes to attack do not believe that I want to forestall it. We let it attack, if it wants, because the defense is then still cheaper. It is to attack calmly, it becomes thereby heavily out-bleeds, and we to have still corrects breakthroughs. Anyhow not the Russians at the Pyreneeses or before Sevilla, that stand are the same distances as for us today until Stalingrad, or say we, up to the Terek. And we stand nevertheless there, which can at the end did not abgestritten to become, that are nevertheless a fact. If it does not go naturally any longer differently, then one changes over suddenly and says themselves, it is at all a fault that the Germans went to Kirkenes, or to Narvik, or now for example to Stalingrad. One is to be waiting nevertheless whether that was a strategic fault. We already notice it at very many signs whether it was a fault that we occupied the Ukraine that we occupied the ore area of Kriwoi Rog that we brought the manganese ores into our hand. Whether it was really a large fault that we the Kuban area, which occupied perhaps largest grain chamber of the world? Whether also a fault was that we probably approximately four fifth or five Sechstel of all refineries destroyed or took that we brought and/or completely shut down alone a production from Neun to Zehn to Millionen tons oil first of all into our hand, or that we prevented a further transport of perhaps filters, Acht or Neun Millionen tons on the Volga? I do not know really whether that everything only faults were. We notice it already, if the Englishmen had succeeded, us the Ruhr district to take and the Rhine in addition, and then also the Danube and still the Elbe and then also Upper Silesia. That is approximately the Donezgebiet and the ore area of Kriwoi Rog, and if they had afterwards gotten still another part of our sources of petroleum and also the farm servant citizens Börde whether they would then probably say that that was a large fault that they had taken the German away these things? It is to be gotten understandably that one can count in so world-wide rings, as it presents itself today to us not on it, by week on week a new success. That is a thing of the impossibility. It is not crucial also at all. It is crucial that one refers gradually the positions, which must destroy the opponent and that one also holds them that one fastens it in such a way that they cannot be taken any longer. And that one can believe me: Which we possess once, we hold then also actually in such a way that, where we stand in this war in Europe another any longer it does not come. I see straight today with a so large Zuversicht into the future. After we got over the past winter, one winter, which one could recognize at that time, when I spoke one year ago to them, not yet in its whole terrible danger. At that time the memory of the Napoleoni fate of 1812 rested nevertheless somehow on many humans. And now the winter of 1812 was so cold only exactly 50 per cent as the winters, which we brought in the past year behind us. In this year we are now differently prepared. It may be missing also in this winter and to others this and that one.
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