The SteelNavy.Com Message Board: Re: Great photo! And a target management question.

You're welcome. And I agree... Well said.

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Thank you for the link to Marcus Perkins's stories of three surviving Japanese pilots who had attacked Pearl Harbor. Their recollections are fascinating, but more importantly, their efforts to heal the enmity between old enemies (American, British and Japanese) are an outstanding example of the powers of forgiveness. I hope that such examples can be found (and reported) in the actions of today's combatants.

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I recall reading that they all had extensive training in visual identification of the US battleships and carriers in particular. And indeed, the first wave especially were assigned specific ships as targets, and expected to find them/pick them out and go for them. They were certainly generally aware of where to look...where they were most likely/expected to be found, so Battleship Row and the 1010 dock were "general targets," but not specific berths. In the excitement of the moment, some did a better--or more careful--job of this than others, which explains why California at the southern end was hit by two torpedoes and Nevada at the northern end was also not heavily torpedoed, while the West Virginia and Oklahoma in the center of Battleship Row were heavily torpedoed. Many torpedo pilots just attacked the center of Battleship Row. (They all had been assigned to hit "battleships." Their specific target "had to be in that cluster somewhere.") The high altitude bombers followed. I recall reading the memories of one pilot whose three-plane V was assigned to hit Arizona. Also, the Japanese were very surprised at how quickly the US started to shoot back, and with the intensity of this return fire. That put some pilots off their targets, and downed others, contributing to generally lesser damage "elsewhere" than along Battleship Row, particularly amongst the second wave.

The first wave was in two parts. The opening part hit the airfields heavily to destroy the ability to fight back with planes. The second part was the torpedo bombers and then the high altitude bombers sent to concentrate on the battleships and carriers. Finding no carriers then caused pilots assigned to them to "double up" on the battleships. The high altitude bombers flew from South to North right over Battleship Row in a line of 3-plane V-formations. Each V pilot was expected to identify that V's assigned battleship target and all drop on it. I've read no accounts of how well disciplined they executed that, in contrast with the torpedo bombers of whom I read they got excited and sloppy in target selection.

The second wave was dive bombers, and they were assigned dry docks, and the cruisers and destroyers. Their attacks were then more "scattered," and the second wave encountered more intense AA. Still, they hit the drydocks, and caused their share of destruction.

Here is a general description:

https://www.history.navy.mil/our-collections/photography/wars-and-events/world-war-ii/pearl-harbor-raid/overall-views-of-the-pearl-harbor-attack.html

Here, the memoires of three Japanese pilots...a first wave torpedo bomber pilot, a second wave dive bomber pilot, and a fighter pilot who flew "high cover." The torpedo bomber pilot confirms he was assigned a specific ship. So was the second wave dive bomber pilot, who found his target--Arizona--blazing away, but dutifully dropped his bombs on it:

https://marcusperkins.co.uk/pearl-harbor

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I've often wondered if the Japanese pilots were assigned to target specific berths rather than specific ships. If so, it would explain some interesting events.

From an attack management perspective, assigning pilots to attack specific berths is efficient. No need for hunting certain types of ships, better separation and array of attacking forces (reduces the risk of mid-air collisions in congested airspace), reduced risk of wasting torpedoes and bombs on already destroyed targets, simplifies damage assessment, etc.

We know that the Japanese had good intel on the harbor including excellent navigable charts. For example, the charts were good enough to plan mini sub operations in the harbor. It is very likely that the Japanese knew exactly which type of ship would most probably be at which berth.

So, for example, Berth X is the home of a battleship. A battleship will require Y number of torpedoes and Z number of bombs to destroy it. So the forces assigned to target Berth X will be Y torpedo bombers and Z level bombers. And so forth.

Targeting specific berths might explain why Utah got hammered. She was moored at a berth typically used by carriers. It would explain why ships anchored in the harbor away from berths suffered much less attention, like Phoenix .

Japanese pilot is assigned Berth X and goes in, expends his ordnance on whatever is at Berth X, and then gets out fast to fight another day. Any other potential targets are ignored.

Perhaps someone better read knows how targets were actually assigned to Japanese pilots at Pearl Harbor.

Just some thoughts.