https://www.nvr.navy.mil/INDEX.HTM
Playing around with this site will show you everything we have. Here's the "most pertinent page" :
https://www.nvr.navy.mil/NVRSHIPS/FLEETSIZE.HTML
You can click the top of either column for a more detailed breakdown.
And I agree, they are a good idea. As I noted elsewhere in the thread, by law the Navy is required to have 11 carriers, 55 Small Surface Combatants, and about 104 Large Surface Combatants. Due to several factors, we currently have 11 carriers, 23 Small Surface Combatants, and 87 Large Surface Combatants. Here is a list of what is building:
https://www.navycommissionings.org/
If it was this straight forward, we would be in pretty good shape eventually. However, as Francine's complaint at the top of the thread notes, there's all the stuff the Navy asks to decommission each fiscal year to factor into the mix. Congress does not allow all the desired cuts, but usually ends up agreeing to some. So, we're losing a few ships to offset the figures in the links I have given. Slows our growth. China has more ships, and is growing steadily. That bothers those who keep track of fleet sizes. An astute student of military history will know that smaller forces have defeated larger forces on many occasions, but also we are far and away more global in our reach. Currently... At this point, there is a general consensus that if we do not get the fleet on a positive growth track and stay there, China will eventually expand globally, and we will be disadvantaged.
Where the disagreement comes between the Navy and the politicians is in fleet "quality." The Navy has stated it prefers quality over quantity, and wants to stay on the cutting edge of tech development. They know that when a war breaks out, their funding goes up, and they will get more ships. They want whatever goes into production to be the most high tech thing the times can produce. Congress just wants numbers, and objects to letting worn out systems like the Ticondeogas go without replacements already in hand. If a war breaks out, they want as large a fleet as possible in existence. However, if large numbers of those ships are worn out and break down, they will not be much good. And the costs of keeping them repaired and going are excessive. So, the Navy would rather let them (and anything else they can get away with) go and invest the money into speedier development of things like unmanned vessels and lasers which are very close, but need more to get them fully into service.
It is "part of the national debate." Both positions certainly have merit. On the face of it, "the average person" will likely just want more numbers. There is a case to be made for allowing numbers to drop to gain the better technology, though.
That part hasn't changed in 80+ years. Or has it?
Part of that "from the sea" to support operations ashore came from the reality of operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. The primary threat to the nation did not look to be from the sea, and the "main show" and lion's share of the defense budget, was with ground forces. The Navy was to provide a supporting role.
Are you familiar with Millenium Challenge 2002? That did not help the Navy's case at all either. That is a leading factor of our desire to "go littoral." We realized and became very focused on the threats which could come from there.
Right after the Cold War, the peace dividend translated to losing all the steam powered escorts...the Knoxes, the Leahys and Belknaps, etc. Then we dropped the nuclear ones. We kept gas turbines...Ticonderogas, Spruances and Perrys. We made a decision to not make any further frigates after the Perrys except for export, and the planned Spruance replacement--what became the Zumwalt--was tailored to better operate in a littoral environment. The idea of Streetfighter was put forth, but was only a new notion at that point. This is all during the 1990s. In 1996, China decided to become a global sea power.
In 2001, we had September 11th. Our national defense outlook altered considerably. In 2002, Millenium Challenge happened. Also in 2002, the Navy decided to "actively pursue" the Littoral Combat Ship, and the original idea was to experiment with four hulls. The DD2000 hull was still the official production plan, and it was even labeled as a "littoral combatant ship." DD2000 was having alarming projected costs. The ground war was where most money was directed. DD2000 was deemed to cost too much, and started being reorganized and downsized. At that point, the Navy also learned it would lose two new shipyards if production was not started on an LCS. It cost then (and still costs now, even after all the price hikes) much less than the DD2000 "littoral combatant ship." It was not hard at all to get everyone on board with the cheaper ship. "And they're both littoral combatants, right?"
In the end, DD2000 was reorganized into Zumwalt, and reduced to three examples due to financial reasons. LCS had a troubled development. China's rise continues. There was a period where supporting operations ashore was reality. I think you'll find AEGIS became theater defense in around 2010 "or so" when theater ballistic missile defense got assigned to the Navy. Again, another reality.
Times changed. The Navy has changed with them. Mismanagement would be if we had not adapted, or tried to adapt.
I disagree that “40 years of Navy mismanagement … discarded a sea control strategy.” What happened to us was the “peace dividend.” At the end of the Cold War, those who were ignorant of 50 years of history (and the operational philosophy that underpinned the Maritime Strategy) concluded that we had a "blue water" Navy solely optimized for some sort of cataclysmic engagement with the Soviets somewhere in the mid-Atlantic. Without that "blue water" threat, what had to follow was a new "reality:" we would operate “from the sea” in support of operations ashore. “Littoral” quickly became a budget analyst’s weapon and marketing catchphrase. Pity the program that could not reinvent itself by inserting the word somewhere into its requirement. Notice how quickly AEGIS became theater missile defense.
Yes very well said but you missed the 40 years of Navy mismanagement that discarded a sea control strategy . Maybe a good face can be put on the lack of numbers and call it distributed lethality or something like that .
Well said (as usual!), Ralph. I would add that a naval strategy that is an element of a well-publicized overall national military strategy is essential before we talk about force levels and funding. A primary reason for the success of the Maritime Strategy of the 1980’s and the force structure it rationalized, besides the tenure of Navy Secretary Lehman, was that it was understood by those who would execute it (the Navy), by those who were paying for it (the American public), and by those who were the objects of it (the Soviet Union). Creating this environment today will be an all-hands effort, but as the Maritime Strategy showed, it can be done.
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