Steve, you are quite correct in saying "Clearly, something has gone terribly, terribly wrong with Navy acquisitions."

Here is my take on one reason, again from my article:

“Well-intentioned but shortsighted efforts, resulting in mismanagement of the acquisition workforce (AWF) by both the Department of Defense and the Navy itself, have crippled the nation’s ability to properly build warships. Without the expertise and corporate memory of a competent AWF, the service is rudderless and at the mercy of the myriad external pressures that force mistakes—here, commitment to entire classes of ships before it understands what it is buying. Dismantling the AWF actually began before the Cold War ended: “The 2010 DoD Strategic Human Capital Plan Update acknowledged that due to efforts to reduce Government and outsource tasks to civilian contractors, the . . . AWF decreased substantially (56 percent) between 1987 and 2004.” ... More to the point, through decades of a seemingly endless, perhaps quixotic quest for “acquisition reform,” recent shipbuilding debacles suggest the service has yet to fully develop the body of naval officers who are the public face and, with their civil service counterparts, the bedrock of effective procurement. Despite well-intentioned initiatives—the weapon system acquisition manager, matériel professional, and now the acquisition corps—this core competency remains elusive. The fundamental problem is that uniformed acquisition professionals, qualified through education and experience, also must remain competitive for promotion as unrestricted line officers. There rarely is enough time in an “up-or-out” career to achieve both.”

“Finally, if achieving effective acquisition means that the competent acquisition corps officer is not competitive in the unrestricted line, the Navy should accept reality and implement a more pragmatic career path. If quality and “waterfront credibility” are the ostensible goals, delivering a ship that actually works should be a more than adequate demonstration.”