In the May 2020 Proceedings, I had an article published – “They Don’t Build ’Em Like That Anymore.” Though my focus was on the then-pending FFG(X), some excerpts (references omitted) might provide some insight:

“Pressure to restore force structure and the “business imperatives” of maintaining shipbuilding facilities and preserving the workforce will make exercising the option [for FFG(X)]nearly irresistible, begging the question of how many ships will be on the building ways before it is known if the broad range of systems and capabilities envisioned in the solicitation can be effectively integrated into a hull whose size is already determined?”

“The near-inevitability of this scenario indicates the surface Navy is still locked in a post–Cold War pattern of committing to entire classes of combatants without first understanding what those ships can accomplish. Allowing itself to be stampeded into premature serial production has now brought the Navy to the plate to strike out three straight times [PC, LCS, DDG 1000]. Will FFG(X) be the next acquisition failure…?”

“Faced with uncertainty, the Navy once turned to “one-offs”—prototypes or technology demonstrators—to evaluate capabilities and investigate operational concepts. Many achieved their objectives, while others—no less importantly—did not.”

“This ability to prototype was possible largely because that Navy had greater “control” over shipbuilding decisions and therefore its warfighting capability. First and foremost, Navy engineers were engineers, not contract managers. Interbureau rivalries notwithstanding, the General Board, and later the Ship Characteristics Board (SCB), used the Navy’s well-established preliminary design capability to develop configuration studies and evaluate trade-offs. The Navy then could contract with independent firms (e.g., Gibbs & Cox) to prepare detailed designs for use by industry. The option to build prototypes in naval shipyards was available as leverage to induce private yards to participate.”

“One of the great losses in outsourcing expertise was the invaluable preliminary design function of the Naval Sea Systems Command; therefore, it should come as no surprise that while the Arleigh Burke-class destroyer’s preliminary design was accomplished in-house, it was not for LCS or the Zumwalt class.”

Happy to discuss further either here or off-line.

Jim