I was looking through my bookmarks for this while composing that, but gave up. Just now came across it.
If you look at where current US Navy force structure thinking is at right now, it looks much more like the Jeune Ecole: https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jeune_École
This really would be a topic for another thread, but since we're "here and happening," here's some links:
The last Force Structure Assessment in 2016 was weighted towards larger numbers of heavy ships: https://warontherocks.com/2016/12/a-quick-review-of-the-navys-new-force-structure-assessment/
The current Force Structure Assessment was due out at the end of last year, but has been delayed by internal debates. However, it is expected to shift the force to a larger fleet of smaller (and more high tech) ships (into which LCS fits just fine conceptually. Poltically, however, we are completely done with them. While we will build no more of them, take a look at what the proposed concepts are, and tell me you do not see a ton of similarities with the LCS idea.)
At the same time as the formal FSA came out in 2016, Congress ordered and received 3 other alternate assessments--one from MITRE, one from the CSBA, and one from the Pentagon (an independent Navy team, specifically.)
Details here: https://whitefleet.net/2017/03/04/csba-mitre-and-pentagon-reports-envision-future-of-us-navys-fleet/
And here: https://news.usni.org/2017/02/14/trio-of-studies-look-to-the-u-s-navy-fleet-of-2030
From these, I now direct you to focus specifically on the CSBA plan. Note the title..."Big Wars, Small Ships". That is telling: https://breakingdefense.com/2017/02/big-wars-small-ships-csbas-alternative-navy/
There are ideas for small corvettes (which echo Cebrowski's Street Fighter, which is the root of the LCS.) There are early notions of unmanned platforms.
This CSBA way of thinking has gained traction since it came out in 2017. It is now being seen by more of "the establishment" as the path to pursue. It is opposed by those still looking to keep our forces weighted towards large vessels, and this is the debate which has delayed the new Force Structure Assessment. If this school of thinking prevails, this is the current incarnation of its vision, which the USMC leadership has now also gotten on board with: https://news.usni.org/tag/2019-force-structure-assessment https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/us-navys-new-secret-weapon-heavily-armed-missile-corvettes-60982
And that brings me to this interesting little concluding link. Even within an idea that advocates smaller robot ships, there are those who think the biggest of them is too big/should be smaller still... https://www.defensenews.com/naval/2020/01/10/does-the-us-navy-have-its-robot-warship-concept-all-wrong/
I don't know about anyone else, but after immersing myself in all of this, I plainly see tons of parallels between this, and the ideas which got us the LCS. And I see the Jeune Ecole.
History likes to repeat itself. In this case, it is doing so because the problems and solutions to grappling with the coastal issue for the US Navy are fixed, so they will be repeated everytime we visit the issue. I am along for the ride. Can't wait to see what we end up with this time.
Just as the Royal Navy's First Sea Lord Sir John Fisher scrapped the ships that "could neither run nor fight" in the early 20th century it looks like the USN is drawing the correct conclusions about its misbegotten progeny of an age of slogans and mindlessness.