The Condor was originally designed, and was used, as an airliner for trans-Atlantic service. As such, it was designed with the lightest structure possible. The war prevented the start of commercial trans-Atlantic service.
Lacking any other long range aircraft, the Condor was pressed into service by the Luftwaffe.
Keep in mind that the war in Europe started two years before the war in the Pacific.
The difference between a Condor and a Fortress lies in purpose and capability. The Fortress at Midway was the B-17E version, a high altitude bomber. At operational altitude it could defend against the Zero with some chance of success. At that altitude it also had a very low probability of hitting a single moving target even with the Norden bomb sight. In an intense anti-air environment, using high altitude tactics it had a decent chance of survival, but poor chance of success. Trying to employ the machine the same way as a B-25 or A-20 was absolutely beyond its intended capability. At low altitude it had a better chance of a hit, but a much lesser chance of survival long enough to make the drop. At the early stages of the Pacific War the formation tactics later to be used in the ETO had not been developed . As the war progressed , the B-17 found much better employment, using much better tactics, in Europe and survived as a useful weapon well after the war.
The Condor was an altogether different type of aircraft with significant structural weaknesses. It was designed to function at lower altitudes and employed under conditions where fighter interception was minimalized. Its strong points were range and loiter time. It's hey day was very short. Given time and at fairly low altitude it stood a fair chance of hitting a merchant ship, which had a poor anti-air capability. It was highly susceptible to intense anti-aircraft fire and fighter interdiction. Germany never had enough of them or the support resources necessary to employ them in a role as strategic bombers. The Ju-88 was much more successful at the same job, granted at much shorter ranges. Once the early stage of the Atlantic War passed, its function changed to maritime reconnaissance as opposed to attack and it tried to stay away from fighter engagement when at all possible. Eventually the tactical climate became much more hostile and its employment very limited. In short, history passed it by.
Not strictly a floaty-things subject but please cut some slack.
'Been reading Midway stuff this week and was once again dismayed at the total lack of success of USAAF B-17s at Midway.
Considering, the much, much less capable / martial FW 200 Condor was "The Scourge of the Atlantic" for two years and sunk hundreds of thousands of tons...
...why did not the B-17 crews of the time who were expected to take on ships, utilize the Condors' frighteningly effective, proven techniques against IJN ships?
Attempting to hit a moving, able-to-evade-maneuver, ship from a straight-course plane at altitude, using a high-altitude bombsight seems rather iffy at absolute best.
A half dozen B-17Es coming in at 500 feet, leading-abeam their targets, at dawn or dusk, multiple .50s sweeping the ships' decks and releasing bombs in a shallow dive would certainly have accomplished more than six strings of bombs hitting water 500 or more yards off the target's position, as happened at Midway.
Thoughts? Thank you.