: ...was no slouch and I've always felt the Type
: 93 has been overrated, as it came to be
: used. The Japanese had looked to their long
: range, concealed, tactics in terms of a
: decisive bluewater fleet engagement, not the
: confined waters they eventually fought in.
: Your critique of the disadvantages fails to
: take that into account.
: However, the Japanese labored under their
: own problems with the Type 93 not least of
: which was that oxygen fed damage could very
: quickly get out of control...the instances
: of IJN vessels damaged--or worse--by their
: own oxygen and torpedo warheads is rather
: The Special Type--the Fubuki Class--spent
: most of the war lugging Type 90's and doing
: very well with them. I don't have the info
: in front of me but I believe only about 4 to
: 6 vessels were eventually converted to carry
: the Type 93 and I'll lay odds that this
: occurred to simplify the logistics issues
: more than anything else.
: Given the confined waters of the Solomons
: virtually any decent torpedo was going to do
: plenty of damage if it hit and detonated.
: Ironically, it seems more USN fish detonated
: on friendly hulls--no, I don't buying the
: assertion that Canberra was torpedoed by
: Bagley --than on Japanese hulls until the
: Summer of '43. Once the USN wised up to its
: torpedo problems things began to turn their
: way, particularly with regard to the
: submarine force. Of course, you know this.
: I recently ran across an account of an
: airman venting his spleen over the
: performance of USN torpedoes and the powers
: that be (up to and including King) were most
: disturbed that he brought this up...I
: believe this is found in The Buzzard
: Brigade * but I'll have to check if you want
: further details.
: The location of the hits you mentioned
: regarding the cruisers at Tassafaronga is, I
: believe, sheer chance....but let's not
: forget that Minneapolis took a torpedo
: nearly dead amidships and Pensacola one
: aft of amidships. The Japanese made it a
: point to set their fish to the highest speed
: and flush the tubes as soon as possible.
: They were not, btw, surprised at
: Tassafaronga. TF67 entered the action
: dedicated to keeping outside 12,000 yards of
: any IJN surface craft but found themselves
: sucked in as they lost situational
: At First Savo, much damage was caused by
: Type 6 hits on Quincy and--in my
: opinion--on Chicago as well; Atlanta was
: struck by Type 90's at 1st Guadalcanal and
: disabled. It is possible at 2nd Guadalcanal
: that the superstructure of SoDak provided
: sufficient deception as to avoid hits.
: Meanwhile, Washington engaged in robust
: evasive maneuvering something which had not
: really occurred among USN surface forces
: during night encounters up to that time.
: There was too much time being spent tied to
: the line, and a long line at that, which
: provided the Japanese with a wealth of
: targets and opportunities, all wrapped up in
: As for explosive power, we could look to
: Brown's catalog of damage versus warhead
: capability** and see that the USN was rather
: consistently looking at 660 pounds of TNT
: equivalent--IIRC--being sufficient to
: account for the damage that experience and
: yard repairs were indicating. It may be
: that the Type 93 warhead was a bit of
: overkill...that other factors contributed to
: damage and/or loss. I was just reviewing my
: writeup on USS Chester today--it had been
: buried in the garage for some time--where
: she was struck by a Type 95 submarine
: torpedo. The damage she sustained was
: enormous and could have led to her loss.
: But good ol' USN damage control paid
: The Long Lance was a good torpedo but it was
: used in actions which did not reflect what
: the design was supposed to accomplish.
: However, the Japanese made good use of the
: weapon as long as they could; can't fault
: them on results.
: * -
: ** - Found in an early volume of Warship
: or another.
: Anyway, now for that Easter chocolate.
: Randy Stone